By empirically testing short selling activities that occur before changes in analysts' recommendations, this paper examines the “informed front-running hypothesis” that predicts an abnormal decrease (increase) of short selling before analyst upgrades (downgrades). According to Blau and Wade's (2012) conceptual framework, this study divides analyst recommendation changes into analyst upgrades and downgrades and uses four measures of abnormal short turnover used in Christophe et al. (2010) and Blau and Wade (2012). This study shows that abnormal shorting increases significantly before both downgrades and upgrades. After dividing the sample into KOSPI and KOSDAQ categories based on market type, domestic and foreign analysts' recommendation changes, and investor type (institutions, foreigners, and individuals), the study finds no evidence that short sellers have the ability to acquire information about upcoming recommendation changes before the information becomes publicly available. The study also finds that pre-recommendation short selling does not predict upcoming events. These findings disprove the informed front-running hypothesis and are generally consistent with Blau and Wade's (2012) argument that short selling before recommendation changes is more likely to be speculative than informed.