Asian Review of Financial Research Vol.39 No.2 pp.97-124
https://www.doi.org/10.37197/ARFR.2026.39.2.4
Illiquidity of Alternative Assets and Ex-Post Response Model of Pension Funds
Key Words : Ex-post response,Expenditure shocks,Pension funds,Strategic asset allocation,Allocation constraints
Abstract
This study examines ex-post responses in pension fund asset management when pre-determined asset allocation constraints are breached due to abrupt market fluctuations or unexpected expenditure shocks. In practice, Korean pension funds typically rely on static strategic asset allocation frameworks that specify target weights and allowable ranges for each asset class. While such frameworks play a central role in risk management and long-term portfolio governance, they are inherently static and provide limited guidance on how investment committees should respond once allocation constraints are violated. This limitation becomes particularly critical in the presence of alternative assets, which are characterized by substantial illiquidity and high transaction costs when liquidated prematurely. Hence, this study develops a formal decision-making model that explicitly incorporates the illiquidity of alternative assets and evaluates the economic implications of different ex-post responses from the perspective of the funding ratio. We consider a pension fund portfolio consisting of two asset classes: liquid traditional assets and illiquid alternative assets. In the presence of an exogenous expenditure shock that necessitates asset sales, the fund faces a discrete ex-post decision between two response strategies. The first strategy is immediate liquidation, in which both liquid and alternative assets are sold in proportions that strictly adhere to the original target allocation weights. This response maintains consistency with the pre-defined strategic asset allocation and the associated risk-return profile, but it entails potentially large and deterministic transaction costs due to the forced liquidation of illiquid assets. The second strategy is a temporary suspension of allocation constraints, under which the fund meets its liquidity needs solely by selling liquid assets while postponing the liquidation of alternative assets. This approach avoids immediate transaction costs but allows for deviation from target weights, potentially worsening the risk-return trade-off relative to the efficient frontier implied by mean-variance optimization. The model evaluates these two ex-post responses by comparing the expected utility of the funding ratio at the end of the period. Preferences are represented by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function defined over the funding ratio, reflecting the objective of pension fund investment committees to balance return generation against the risk of underfunding. Within this framework, we examine how the optimal ex-post response depends on three key determinants: the transaction costs associated with alternative assets, the magnitude of the expenditure shock, and the pension fund's constant relative risk aversion coefficient. Our analysis yields several notable findings. The relative risk aversion coefficient emerges as the dominant factor in determining the optimal ex-post response. While higher transaction costs generally increase the attractiveness of suspending allocation constraints by making immediate liquidation more expensive, their effect is often dominated by the fund's degree of risk aversion. Pension funds with higher levels of risk aversion exhibit a strong preference for immediate liquidation, even when transaction costs are substantial. This preference arises because highly risk-averse decision makers penalize the increased uncertainty and tail risk associated with deviations from the target allocation more heavily than the certainty of transaction costs incurred through liquidation. In contrast, the magnitude of the expenditure shock itself plays a relatively minor role in the decision, once the effects of risk aversion and transaction costs are taken into account. Furthermore, the study highlights the critical role of the gap between the initial allocation to alternative assets and the optimal allocation implied by mean-variance optimization. When the initial weight of alternative assets exceeds the mean-variance optimal level, suspending allocation constraints exacerbates the deviation from the efficient portfolio and further deteriorates the risk-return trade-off. In such cases, immediate liquidation is more likely to be optimal, particularly for risk-averse funds. Conversely, when the initial allocation to alternative assets is below the optimal level, a temporary suspension of allocation constraints can be welfare-improving. By selling only liquid assets, the relative share of alternative assets increases endogenously, moving the portfolio closer to the optimal allocation while simultaneously avoiding transaction costs. This result demonstrates that the desirability of ex-post flexibility is contingent upon the ex-ante positioning of the portfolio. These findings underscore the importance of linking ex-post decision rules to ex-ante asset allocation design. While ex-post flexibility can mitigate unnecessary costs and improve outcomes following shocks, such flexibility is not unconditional. Rather, it is supported by an appropriately calibrated strategic asset allocation that aligns initial portfolio weights with optimal risk-return trade-offs. In this sense, the study emphasizes that effective ex-post responses are not substitutes for sound ex-ante asset allocation, but complements that depend on the quality of the initial allocation. This study contributes to the literature by providing a structured and tractable framework for evaluating ex-post responses in pension fund asset management under illiquidity and allocation constraints. Unlike existing studies that primarily focus on ex-ante optimization or permanent changes in allocation policy, this paper formalizes the trade-off faced by pension funds when responding to realized shocks within a static strategic allocation framework. From a practical perspective, the results offer clear guidance for pension fund investment committees and outsourced chief investment officer (OCIO) managers. By jointly considering transaction costs, risk preferences, and the alignment between initial and optimal asset allocations, the proposed framework supports more disciplined and transparent ex-post decision-making. Ultimately, the analysis suggests that a model-based approach to ex-post responses can enhance the robustness of pension fund governance by preventing mechanically enforced rebalancing and by promoting economically justified flexibility under well-defined conditions.










