We investigate how geographic locations of international mutual funds affect fund performance and investment behavior for both emerging and developed markets. Using one- and three-factor alphas, we find that local funds outperform remote ones especially in emerging markets. However, under the four-factor alpha, they tend to underperform. A plausible explanation is that the excess returns for local fund man-agers are attributable to momentum and thus disappear when this is controlled. Regarding trading behavior, we compare herding among same or local-region versus different or remote-region fund managers. We find that fund trades correlate more with trades of other funds in the same (local) regions than with those in different (remote) regions. This phenomenon is more profound in the case of emerging markets. This finding is consistent with the networking (word-of-mouth) effect among investors. We also find that local funds exhibit more market timing behavior but are less active in stock picking. The result suggests that local managers are more affected by market sentiment and therefore their trading is more affected by market move-ments whereas remote fund managers focus more on stock fundamentals. This is the first study to test the relation between the international fund performance and geography and contributes to the literature on funds and international investments.

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Managers are motivated to keep the funding ratio of a firm’s defined benefit (DB) pension plan from reaching its optimal level. This phenomenon can be explained by agency theory, which suggests that agency costs can be mitigated by a good governance structure. This study analyzes the effect of a firm’s corporate governance on the funding of its defined benefit corporate pension plan. The funding ratio is measured as the ratio of the current value of the plan’s assets over the pension benefit obligations (PBO). The sample includes 478 companies listed on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index from 2006 to 2018. The results indicate that firms with better governance tend to have higher funding ratios. As South Korea lacks mandatory regulations requiring firms to keep their pension funding ratio above a minimum level, firms can keep their ratio low. Good governance implies that a manager is required to maintain a higher ratio. In addition, sub-structures of governance, defined as components constituting the overall governance, have a meaningful relationship with the funding ratio. Important sub-structures include the ownership structure, the board of directors, and the labor union. This study has the following findings. First, a firm’s pension ratio increases with its corporate governance index. This result is stronger after controlling for the size of the firm. An implication of this finding is that good governance mitigates the agency problems of outside equity and debt, increases the funding ratio, and enhances firm value. Second, a firm’s pension funding ratio increases with the managers’ share-holding ratio. This result suggests that the managers decide to accumulate more pension assets as their interests become better aligned with those of shareholders. Thus, the ownership structure is an important component of the governance structure in that it affects the corporate pension policy. This paper also investigates the influence of outside shareholders on the funding ratio. Active outside shareholders are expected to monitor managers and mitigate the managerial incentive problem. The funding ratio increases with the foreign investor share ratio, which is a proxy for the extent of the alignment of interests between the managers and the outside shareholders. A fourth finding is that the funding ratio increases as the proportion of outside directors on the board increases after controlling for a nonlinear term. This result implies that firms are more active in accumulating pension assets if their board of directors are independent of the managers and so are more able to successfully mitigate the agency problem. Fifth, this paper measures the bargaining power of labor unions by looking at their affiliation with a nation-wide umbrella organization. A direct measure of labor’sthe bargaining power of labor, such as whether an individual firm has a labor union, is not practical, as almost all firms have labor unions. Affiliation with an umbrella union does not improve the funding ratio. SEuch an affiliation either fails to help the union enhance its bargaining power or it leads the union to engage in political issues instead of benefittingsupporting employees. These results are tested for robustness by adopting various specifications of the primary regression model. The alternative specifications include using alternative measure of the funding ratio, introducing lagged independent variables, controlling for endogeneity, performing sub-sample analyses, and using the funding ratio in excess of the relevant yearly industry average as the dependent variable. In South Korea, firms appear to have an incentive to underfund their defined benefit pension plan in the absence of mandatory regulation on the minimum funding level. This study suggest that better corporate governance mitigates various types of agency problems and thereby enhances firm value as a result of higher pension funding levels. In future work, it would be worthwhile to conducting a comprehensive study of the optimal level of pension funding. In general, if a firm’s pension funding level is too low, thereit may experiencebe agency problems or financial constraints at the firm; if a firm’s pension funding is above the optimal level, the its cash is being used inefficiently. An in-depth analysis of the labor union factors likely to be overlooked in corporate governance would also be beneficial. Studies could also examineing the relationship between corporate governance and pension asset management. There is growing controversy regarding the reasons behind the persistently dominant holding of interest-guaranteed assets over other types of assets by defined benefit pension plans. Researchers should also examine the introduction of a fund-type pension plan in addition to a contract-type pension plan, which is currently being discussed in South Koreais .

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P2P lending has emerged as an alternative financing tool, complementing existing financial systems by allowing investments and loans without collateral or guarantees through an online brokerage platform. By reducing the cost of financial transactions, P2P increases the efficiency of financial markets. This paper investigates how the investment information provided by a P2P lending platform affects the investment decisions for small business loans. Small business P2P loans play an important role in alternative financing for small businesses with financial constraints and difficulties obtaining loans from traditional financial institutions. We collect data from 2007 to 2017 on investment amount per capita and investment information for four P2P lending platforms: Lending Club in the U.S., Funding Circles in the U.K., and Eight Percent and Funda in South Korea. re The regression analysis yieldsare two main findings. First, the investment amount per capita increases when (a) the loan application amount is larger, (b) the loan period is shorter, or (c) the number of investors is smaller. T; this finding holds on all platforms. Second, how the investment amount per person changes with the loan interest rate depends on the type of platform. In a posted-price platform, which matches borrowers' capital demands with investors' funds at a predetermined interest rate (as is the case with Landing Club, Eight Percent, and Funda), the higher the interest rate, the higher the per capita investment. In contrast, on platforms such as Funding Circle, which is an auction platform wherein the loan interest rate and theloan amount are determined through an auction, the investment amount per person decreases as the loan interest rate increases, perhaps because investors interpret high interest rates as a sign of high risk. The regression analysis involving borrower information shows that Landing Club's business period information, Funda's business type information, and Eight Percent's loan objective information have statistical significance in determining the loan amount. In addition, the financial information on each platform and the credit-related information on Landing Club, such as bankruptcy information and overdue information, significantly influence the decisions on the investment amount per person. These results demonstrate the importance of providing investors with reliable borrower information to help them make investment decisions by reducing information asymmetry problems. These findings suggest that the financial constraints of low-credit borrowers can be reduced and financial efficiency improved by having more investors participate in P2P lending. The development directions of the domestic P2P lending market identified in this study are as follows. Most domestic P2P lending platforms are small. Their loans tend to beinvolve short-terms, and involveto comprise more real estate loans than business loans. Most platforms need to improve their lending field by focusing on credit lending rather than mortgage lending. The domestic P2P lending market is still too small for financial resource allocation. There is a need to improve the participation of institutional investors who can contribute to the growth of the P2P lending market. BecauseAs most domestic P2P loan platforms are small, it is necessary to support the growth of large specialized platforms designed to improve financing efficiency and investor protection. For domestic P2P lending to evolve into a viable alternative financing venue, platforms must develop their own credit risk assessment models and provide borrowers’ financial and credit information to enhance trust. Domestic P2P lending platforms must provide reliable information about borrowers' credit, as is done by Lending Club. Providing high-quality investment information to P2P lenders reduces the information asymmetry between borrowers and investors and improves the efficiency of the P2P lending market. To develop the domestic small business P2P lending market, the government should incentivize P2P lending investment and develop the legal basis for investment protection and investment activation. The results in this paper provide a useful basis for improving investment decisions in P2P lending markets and supporting the role of an intermediary in the platform. This study is unique in that it examines the factors influencing investment information from an investor's perspective, a gap in the literature caused by a lack of public data. This empirical study focuses on the factors affecting the investment in domestic P2P lending platforms by comparing these platforms with P2P lending platforms in the United States and the United Kingdom. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to compare the impact of investment information on investment decisions in Landing Club, Funding Circle, Eight Percent, and Funda, which act as P2P lending platforms providing small business credit.

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In the financial industry, many transactions are doneperformed covertly to secure an information advantage over competitors in the market. Trading also demands expertise in risk management and the valuation of the assets under consideration to determine which trades will create value for investors. BecauseAs information asymmetries contribute to profitability, iesthey are intentionally sought by asset managers, meaning that purposefully created information asymmetries are unavoidable and likely to persist within the financial market. It is tthatTherefore, the government must regulate the financial industry more stringently than other industries, such as technology-based manufacturing industries. Moreover, the intensity of separation between banks and other businesses is impacted by the extent of implicit information asymmetries, because the soundness of the finance industry can be severely injured by the very existence of information asymmetries. Being able to distinguish between the positive effects of information asymmetries, which should be encouraged, and the negative impacts of information asymmetries, which should be prohibited, is more important than ever before. This paper investigates this distinction through the regulations set up by of the government. The regulation of the finance industry goes back to the era of laissez-faire capitalism, when the 1907 financial panic resulted in the establishment of the U.S. central bank, the Federal Reserve System. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, financial regulation cul-minated in the Banking Act of 1933, also known as the Glass Steagall Act, which separated Wall Street (banking) from Mmain Sstreet (commerce). Fewer than ten years after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act by the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Great Recession broke out in 2008. As the economy recovers, although with a lower growth rate, and with the development and deployment of information technology such as artificial intelligence, there is again pressure to deregulate but in a different context. The emergence of Iinternet only banks poses a quite different but daunting challenge to the conventional notion of the separation of banking and commerce. Internet only banks foster competition within the banking industry, which has become more oligopolistic in the aftermath of the Great Recession. As these entrants require huge investments in the technical infrastructure to operate properly through the Internet while offering banking services, the traditional regulation of share-holding limits, which has worked effectively since 1933, faces an apparent obstacle. To promote the resilience and reinvigoration of the banking industry, the Korean government lifted its share-holding limit regulation and opened a path for funds from the information and communications technology (ICT) industry sto participate in the share ownership in the banking sector in 2015. This was, a step in the right direction. However, non-ICT investors are still banned from the banking industry. In the meantime, non-ICT industry capital can still participate in the Iinternet banking sector indirectly, either through ownership build-up in an ICT firm or by mimicking an ICT firm under the guise of the ICT industry, circumventing the ban effectively. The new investors in the Internet banking industry demand a further relaxation in share ownership, leading to a call for scrutiny of whether further deregulation promotes competition in the banking industry and enhances the soundness of the financial industry. Desirable self-selection is an important goal, and good quality Internet bank applicants should be allowed to acquire Internet banking licenses while bad quality applicants should not. There is considerable concern as to whether the government’s current revision of the rule banning non-ICT investors from controlling Internet banks could lead to a sustainable separating equilibrium. This paper addresses this point and focuses on the adverse selection problem due to information asymmetries over the quality of prospective participants in the banking industry. The current combination of rules such as the share-holding limit and the loan concentration ratio could open the path to a desirable situation. As the lifting of the share-holding limit is accompanied by credit exposure control (particularly for the loan concentration ratio), it is possible that the ban benefits both Iinternet only banking participants and the government in light of the expected outlay in the case of a bailout due to non-performing loans. The paper demonstrates with a simple theoretical setup that a welfare enhancing outcome is within reach despite the separation lapse after we control the loan concentration ratio while allowing for greater ownership of Iinternet only banks by the ICT industry. This resultfinding will beis of great use to policy makers as they consider the implementation of new rules.

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We study a simple model in which arbitrageurs trade assets in infinitely repeated stages and a financial crisis may occur due to redemption requests of investors on arbitrageurs. If the asset is undervalued, the arbitrageurs buy the asset to make profits. But the mispricing may become even larger in the next period and the arbitrageurs will take huge losses temporarily. Even though the asset price will recover its fundamental value in the end, the temporary losses of the arbitrageurs can force the arbitrageurs to liquidate the funds due to the redemption requests and stay away from the market in all the subsequent stages. Thus, patience of arbitrageurs (the relative weight to the future profits) affects possibility of a financial crisis. This paper shows two properties on the discount factor. First, a financial crisis without external shocks can arise only when arbitrageurs are impatient, and second, if such a crisis may arise, high patience of arbitrageurs mitigates the crisis but enlarges the pre-crisis mispricing. The model setup mimics the modern financial markets and some of them may be viewed as market frictions which prohibit market efficiency. The simplicity of the model allows a closed-form solution.

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Many theories, experiments, and survey studies suggest that investors are ambiguityaverse, thereby implying the existence of a positive ambiguity premium [Please check whether this revision conveys your intended meaning. If not, please suggest a suitable alternative.]. However, some empirical studies suggest contradictory results. Baltussen, Bekkum, and Grient (2018) use the volatility of implied volatility as a proxy for ambiguity and find a negative correlation between the volatility of implied volatility and expected returns. This negative correlation is inconsistent with the theories of Epstein and Schneider (2008) and Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005),which state that investors’ demand for ambiguity premiums in the stock market depends on their ambiguity avoidance. That is, while most extant theoretical studies on ambiguity suggest a positive correlation between ambiguity and expected returns on stocks, most empirical studies rarely prove this relationship. This study analyzes whether there is a significant correlation between ambiguity and expected stock returns in the Korean stock market and also empirically analyzes whether there exists a positive ambiguity premium. In the financial sector, asset-pricing models such as a capital asset -pricing model (CAPM) are based on various assumptions about the distribution of stock returns. For example, a CAPM assumes that stock returns follow a multivariate normal distribution. Many empirical studies, however, question the type of probability distributions of stock returns (Fama, 1965; Rosenberg, 1974; Tsay, 2010); they suggest that the probability distribution of stock returns does not follow a normal distribution, and are even skeptical about whether such a distribution exists. In particular, Knight (1921) argues that ambiguity is defined as the uncertainty about the location and shape of a probability distribution. Ellsberg (1961) and Camerer and Weber (1992) also note that Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity is generally defined as uncertainty about distribution. Thus, the degree of uncertainty in a distribution is directly related to Knight’s (1921) ambiguity definition. If the recent distribution of stock returns unexpectedly differ from those in the past, the investor must pay a higher cost to better understand the difference between the recent and the past probability distribution of returns. Therefore, he/she will require higher premiums to hold these stocks. The main goal of this study is to empirically analyze whether there is a premium for the ambiguity of stock returns at the individual firm-level. To estimate investors’ difficulties in understanding distributions of stock returns, this study presents the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and Kuiper (K) statistics, which measure the difference between the probability distribution of recent stock returns and those of past returns as a proxy for the ambiguity of stock returns. The results show that high-ambiguity stocks in the probability distribution of returns earn, on average, higher returns. An investor who is averse to high-ambiguity stocks demands a premium for that stock, thereby increasing his/her expected returns of the stock. This study examines whether such an ambiguity premium exists in the Korean stock market, and demonstrates that high-ambiguity stocks in return distributions lead to, on average, higher returns. We also find that the difference between the returns for portfolios with the highest and lowest distribution uncertainty is significantly positive. The bottom decile portfolio (S) by KS shows expected average monthly returns of 0.11%, and the top decile, 3.26%. When forming decile portfolios by K, stocks (S) with the least distribution uncertainty provide 0.07% of the expected average monthly average returns, and the stocks (B) with the most distribution uncertainty, 3.22%. In terms of value-weighted average returns, the V-W average returns for portfolios with the most distribution uncertainty are substantially higher. Using Fama and French’s (2015) five-factor model, we show that our measures for distribution uncertainty are highly correlated with alphas estimated from five-factor specifications. The magnitude of the alphas is positively related to the level of distribution uncertainty, implying that high distribution uncertainty portfolios earn more positive abnormal returns. The alphas of the B-S spread are significantly positive. As a result, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic and the Kuiper (K) statistic are correlated with future stock returns. To determine the robustness of the empirical results, we extensively investigate whether the effect of distribution uncertainty persists after controlling for firm characteristics such as beta, size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, short-term reversal, and illiquidity. Overall, the results from these robustness tests using alternative measures of distribution uncertainty still support our hypothesis. Moreover, the results remain significant even after controlling for the characteristics of the distribution of returns, such as intrinsic volatility, skewness, kurtosis, and maximum returns. Next, we examine the cross-sectional relationship between distribution uncertainty and expected stock returns at the firm level using Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. The results show a significant correlation between the degree of distribution uncertainty and expected returns even after controlling for a variety of other firm-level variables. Our findings demonstrate the existence of ambiguity premiums in the Korean stock market.

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Using an investor sentiment index and an index of sentiment changes for the Korean stock market, this study examines how investor sentiment affects a cross-section of stock returns. I examine whether more speculative and harder-to-arbitrage stocks are more sensitive to sentiment, that is, whether their returns co-move more with sentiment changes. I also test whether the returns on extremely unspeculative stocks are negatively related to changes in sentiment, that is, whether they have negative sentiment betas. According to studies on behavioral finance (Shleifer and Summers, 1990; Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991), because a mispricing is the result of an irrational demand shock in the presence of a binding arbitrage constraint, shifts in investor sentiment have cross-sectional effects when sentiment-based demands or arbitrage limits vary across stocks. Consistent with these predictions, prior empirical studies (Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007; Kumar and Lee, 2006) report that more speculative and harder-to-arbitrage stocks—smaller, newer, more volatile, unprofitable, non-dividend paying, distressed or those with extreme growth potential—are more likely to be affected by shifts in investor sentiment. However, the effect of sentiment on the aggregate market is somewhat less clear. Brown and Cliff (2004) show that sentiment has little predictive power for near-term future stock returns, and Schmeling (2009) insist that the effect of sentiment on aggregate stock returns is observed only in the countries that are culturally more prone to herd-like behavior. To reconcile the cross-sectional results and the aggregate results, Baker and Wurgler (2007) suggest one possible explanation known as “the sentiment seesaw,” in that if sentiment fluctuations induce demand shifts between speculative stocks and safe stocks, that is, “the flights to quality within the stock market” occur, the low (high) sentiment reduces (increases) the prices of speculative stocks and at the same time increases (decreases) the prices of safe stocks, resulting in no effect of sentiment on aggregate market returns. In line with this idea, this study analyzes the effect of broad-waved sentiment on a cross-section of stock returns in terms of sensitivity to sentiment. Using financial parlance, I investigate whether more speculative and harder-to- arbitrage stocks have higher sentiment betas, and whether extremely unspeculative and easier-to-arbitrage stocks have negative sentiment betas. As in practice, the same securities that are most sensitive to speculative demands also tend to be the costliest to arbitrage, I hypothesize that stocks most sensitive to investor sentiment are those of companies that are smaller, more volatile, have less tangible assets, are unprofitable, are distressed, and have the potential for extreme growth. At first, I construct the monthly sentiment index and the monthly index of sentiment changes for the Korean stock market based on principal component analysis using five key sentiment proxies: the volatility premium, KSE share turnover, IPO volume, IPO first-day returns, and the proportion of companies with seasonal equity offering. To increase the reliability of the indices and their comparability with international research, I develop these sentiment indices in line with those of Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007). Using these indices and the monthly returns of all of the common stocks of the KOSPI market from 2000 to 2017, I analyze the effect of the changes in investor sentiment on a cross-section of stock returns. I start by forming equalweighted decile portfolios based on several firm characteristics such as firm size, MTB, idiosyncratic volatility, total volatility, asset tangibility, profitability, sales growth, and Rand D ratio, and look for patterns in changes in average returns across deciles when the investor sentiment index changes from +1σ to -1σ. I also consider a regression approach that allows controlling for the Fama-French (1993) factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor. I regress the returns of each decile portfolio and the returns of various high-minus-low portfolios on the index of sentiment changes, respectively. Consistent with my prediction, I find that the stocks with high MTB ratio, high volatility, low PPE ratio, low profitability, and low sales growth, respond more sensitively to changes in investor sentiment than the stocks with low MTB ratio, low volatility, high PPE ratio, high profitability, and high sales growth. In other words, the more speculative and harder-to-arbitrage stocks have higher sentiment betas. The returns of stocks with extremely low MTB ratios and low volatilities are negatively related to changes in sentiment. That is, most bond-like stocks appear to have slightly negative sentiment betas. These findings are consistent with those of prior studies. As the Korean stock market is an individual-crowded and highly integrated market, it is a good test bed for studying issues related to investor sentiment. Using Korean stock market data, my findings shed light on the effect of investor sentiment on a cross-section of stock returns in theory and can help practitioners establish a profitable investment strategy using investor sentiment.

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The puzzle posed originally by Mehra and Prescott (1985) on the asset pricing model of Lucas (1978) consists of two parts: When asset returns predicted by the model are compared with their historical averages, the equity premium is too small and the risk-free rate too large. These phenomena are referred to as the equity premium puzzle (henceforth, Puzzle I) and the risk-free rate puzzle (henceforth, Puzzle II), respectively. Dokko, Park, and Cho (2001: henceforth, DPC) examine these puzzles in the Korean market using annual data from 1975 to 1999, and conclude that while Puzzle I is very weak, Puzzle II is quite strong. In this paper, we re-examine these issues by extending their study in the following three directions: (i) We use quarterly data instead of annual data to enlarge the sample size. (ii) We use the sample data during the 1999–2017 period, considering that a paradigm shift has taken place in the Korean economy after the 1997 “currency crisis.” (iii) Most importantly, besides the time-additive expected utility and the non-expected utility of Epstein and Zin (1989) used in DPC, we adopt five additional utility functions to explore their usefulness in resolving each puzzle. We take two approaches to this study. First, following Kocherlakota (1996), we perform statistical tests directly on the Euler equation that asset returns must satisfy in equilibrium. Second, we apply a calibration method in which closed-form solutions (or their approximations) of asset returns are compared to their historical averages. The results of the two approaches are, by and large, consistent in each of the cases of the seven utility functions that we consider. We make the following observations. In Mehra and Prescott’s basic model, the existence of Puzzle I in Korea is now apparent in the acceptable range of the relative risk aversion coefficient (2-6). The main reason for this may be that the equity premium has increased sharply over the last twenty years. Puzzle II is even stronger, as the risk-free interest rate has fallen significantly. These results, contrasted with those of DPC, are confirmed by several robustness check analyses. The non-expected utility function of Epstein and Zin (1989), in which relative risk aversion is constant with γ, makes no difference with respect to Puzzle I as the equity premium is determined independently of intertemporal substitution. However, it can alleviate Puzzle II substantially if the intertemporal substitution parameter ρ is small. Our estimation of ρ using Korean data shows that it is between 0.252 and 0.887. In this range, the risk-free rate predicted by the model is close to its historical average. The nonexpected utility function with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) has the potential to substantially increase the equity premium significantly. As CARA is translated into increasing relative risk aversion, it makes a high degree of relative risk aversion acceptable. For the same reason, it decreases the risk-free rate further, compared with the preceding utility function. The non-expected utility function exhibiting ambiguity aversion can also be useful in explaining both puzzles. Under certain conditions, the ambiguity aversion parameter η replaces the role of γ in the Epstein and Zin utility function. As ambiguity aversion is, by definition, η > γ, it serves to enhance risk aversion if γ is kept reasonably low, which leads to higher equity premiums and lower risk-free rates. However, given that the empirical magnitude of η is unknown, the usefulness of this utility function is quite restrictive. Merits of the habit formation utility function vary with how habits are specified. A multiplicative external habit model using contemporaneous consumption helps explain Puzzle II, because the pricing kernel in this case becomes unity under log utility ( γ = 1). If  equals one, however, it will weaken Puzzle I. A multiplicative external habit model using lagged consumption weakens Puzzle II substantially, while Puzzle I remains intact. Inherently, it has the effect of magnifying the utility discount factor, which reduces the risk-free rate. An additive external habit model using lagged consumption has a channel to resolve both puzzles simultaneously. A strong consumption habit increases the volatility of the pricing kernel, and also its mean, which raises the equity premium and lowers the risk-free rate. This model, however, has one shortcoming, in that the risk-free rate can easily be negative as the mean of the pricing kernel exceeds one if the consumption habit crosses a certain threshold. In sum, except for the time-additive expected utility, each utility function that we consider can be useful for at least a partial resolution of the two puzzles found in Korea. In particular, the non-expected utility with the CARA model, the ambiguity aversion model, and the additive external habit model have the potential to simultaneously alleviate both puzzles. Among these, the non-expected utility with the CARA model seems to be the most successful, as the explanatory power of the remaining models is rather limited.

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This study is the first to thoroughly investigate the effect of subordinated debt issuance on commercial banks’ profitability and insolvency risk as well as the effect of the Basel III capital framework on this relationship. This study empirically examines the subject of interest by using random-effects panel- data models after controlling for potential determinants of bank profitability and insolvency risk. The Basel III framework, established by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and first introduced in 2010, provides reinforced regulatory standards on capital requirements, leverage measurements, and liquidity measurements for the banking sector (BCBS, 2010; Eubanks, 2010; Financial Supervisory Service, 2012). Specifically, the capital framework includes increased minimum capital adequacy ratios, and owing to this, the effect and importance of subordinated debt, a type of debt capital recognized as Tier 2 capital, have changed. However, despite this change in the role of subordinated debt in the banking sector, academic and empirical investigations of this debt are lacking. Our study fills this gap. We analyze the relationship between subordinated debt and banks by using a random-effects panel-data analysis method. Our sample data, ranging from 2001 to 2018, are an annually collected dataset from the six commercial banks that currently operate in the Korean banking sector. We proxy bank profitability using the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE), and insolvency risk using the distance-toinsolvency Z-score (Boyd and Graham, 1986; Hannan and Hanweck, 1988). We examine the effect of subordinated debt issuance after controlling for other potential determinants of bank profitability and insolvency risk, including banks’ financial ratios, industry- relevant variables, and macroeconomic factors (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). The results of the analyses suggest that subordinated bond issuance negatively affects bank profitability and insolvency risk. The profitability models use either ROA or ROE as the response variable and show that increases in the growth rate of subordinated debt reduce bank profitability. Furthermore, our study considers the interaction between the subordinated debt variable and a dummy variable for Basel III adoption that takes a value of one after 2013, and zero otherwise. We find that the coefficients of the interaction terms are positive for all estimated models, indicating that the negative effect of subordinated debt issuance on bank profitability was substantially mitigated after 2013, when the Basel III accord was first implemented. We also investigate whether the size of previously issued subordinated debt influences the relationship between bank profitability and the issuance of such debt. We measure the relative size of subordinated debt held by a bank as the ratio of subordinated debt to the total debt in period t-1 and sort it into four subgroups based on its quartiles. We find that issuing this debt negatively affects profitability for all subgroups except the subgroup with the largest relative size of subordinated debt, suggesting that banks are not significantly affected by the issuance of additional subordinated debt when they have already issued a sufficiently large amount of subordinated debt relative to their total debt. The Z-score models use the distance-to-insolvency Z-score as the response variable and show that an increase in the growth rate of subordinated debt decreases (increases) the Z-score (insolvency risk). We include the interaction term between subordinated debt issuance and the dummy variable for the adoption of the Basel III regulation in the models. We find that the negative effect of subordinated debt issuance on bank insolvency risk was mitigated after 2013. This finding can be interpreted as resulting from either the enhancement of the integrity of banks’ capital structures after the Basel III regulation or the fact that banks are encouraged to only issue subordinated debt that conforms to reinforced regulation. Finally, we analyze the specific mechanism for the relationship between subordinated debt issuance and bank performance. We find that the growth rate of subordinated debt positively affects banks’ interest costs, indicating that issuing subordinated debt increases banks’ interest costs. We also find that interest costs significantly decrease concurrent profitability and increase concurrent insolvency risk. These results empirically support the hypothesis that subordinated debt issuance incurs costs to banks owing to the relatively high interest rate and can negatively affect bank performance, as prior studies theoretically suggest (Blum, 2002; Kim, 2000). The empirical analyses in this study provide information not only for investors and decision-makers in banks but also for supervisory authorities and policymakers regarding the issuance of subordinated debt. Furthermore, the research methodology used in this study is convenient and practical in that the model uses the financial ratios of banks, industrial variables, and macroeconomic factors that are easily accessible and uses the Z-score as a proxy for bank insolvency risk. Thus, the Z-score can be utilized for insolvency risk analyses in research environments in which the conventional panel logit model is not applicable.

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