In recent years, global major exchanges such as the NYSE, LSE, and TSE have faced an unprecedented amount of a specific type of trading known as high frequency trading (HFT). Although researchers and practitioners have not agreed on the precise definition of HFT, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) loosely defines it as “a trading that uses high-speed computer systems to monitor market data and submit a large number of orders to the market.” HFT began in the late 1990s, and its proportion of total trading volume has rapidly increased during the past decade. In 2009, a rough estimation (by TABB group) indicated that HFT accounted for 60% and 30% of the total trading volumes in the US and European equity markets, respectively. To accommodate and process surging HFT-related orders, exchange-level projects to expand order processing capacity and reduce trade execution time are under way among a number of global exchanges, including the Korea Stock Exchange. On March 23, 2009, the Korea Exchange migrated to the EXTURE (‘EXchange + fuTURE’), an upgraded trade settlement system. The launch of this technically advanced trading system might enable investors to implement HFT in the Korean stock market. However, as far as the authors know, little is known about HFT in the Korean stock market. In this study, we find a special type of HFT has emerged as a conspicuous market phenomenon characterized by the extremely fast repetition of order submissions and cancellations. It closely resembles the ‘strategic runs’ observed on the NASDAQ (Hasbrouck and Saar (2013)). The strategic runs discovered in the Korean stock market consist of a chain of normal orders and its cancellation within a certain period of no more than one second between each consecutive order. We further examine the effect that strategic runs have on market quality in terms of short-term liquidity and volatility, measured in intraday ten-second intervals. To measure liquidity, we use proportional spread and the number of shares at the best bid, or ask prices divided by total number of shares outstanding. The highest price minus the lowest price divided by the bid-ask midpoint is used to calculate volatility. During the 10-second intervals when strategic runs are most concentrated, they attract liquidity by submitting higher proportions of marketable limit orders. This leads to increased spreads, decreased depth, and higher volatility. Furthermore, 10-second interval intraday vector auto regression (VAR) results indicate that strategic runs deteriorate market quality by decreasing market depth and raising volatility. We do not, however, find a statistically significant relationship between strategic runs and spreads. Overall, strategic runs appear to have negative effects on market quality. Our results must be interpreted with caution. Because the sample period of VAR analysis is as short as three months, one cannot make sure whether our main results still hold for the post sample period. Another problem is that strategic run is only a special type of high frequency trading. It implies that we cannot generalize our results based on strategic runs for other types of high frequency trading that we do not know yet. We hope these issues will be examined in the future research. While major exchanges are making considerable capital investments into IT infrastructure and network system recently to accommodate and attract high frequency trading, it is unclear what the socioeconomic benefit of the investment is and who makes profits (or suffers losses) in high frequency trading. As high frequency trading is increasingly dominant in the stock market, individual investors who cannot access stock market as fast as high frequency traders will leave the market, and this may lead to reduction in liquidity and eventually market failure. This paper contributes to the finance literature and the government’s policymaking as follows. First, this study is the first to not only verify that strategic runs exist in the Korean stock market, but also to examine their characteristics and effect on market quality. Second, this study finds strategic runs without incurring errors thanks to the use of account-level trades and quotes data. In contrast, the data used by Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) are subject to inherent limitation, as they do not include account level information. For example, they cannot identify whether two consecutive orders are submitted by the same trader, which makes it difficult to extract strategic runs from quote data. Our study is free from such problems because the data used enable us to identify which traders submit which orders. Finally, given that HFT is in the early stages in the Korean stock market, our results might provide useful information for financial authorities regarding whether they will need to regulate HFT in the Korean stock market.

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The term structure of interest rates is closely related to the macro economy, in that it contains information about the current state of the economy and reflects the bond market participants’ expectations regarding the economy’s future path. It can be effectively used to predict major economic variables, including inflation, and therefore has potential as an indicator variable in the establishment of monetary policy. Due to its economic importance, many researchers in the field of finance and macroeconomics have studied the modeling of the term structure of interest rates. In finance, the focus of such research has been the prediction of interest rates and the pricing of interest rate-related derivatives. In macroeconomics, researchers have mainly attempted to understand the changes in the term structure of interest rates in the context of monetary policy implementation. Since the pioneering work of Ang and Piazzesi (2003), however, macro-finance term structure models combining the advantages of the two traditional approaches have provided a useful means of interpreting the movements of the term structure in the economic context while maintaining the consistency between short- and long-term interest rates with the no-arbitrage restrictions. In this study, we apply the unspanned macro-finance term structure model (unspanned MTSM) to analyze the empirical relationship between the term structure of interest rates and the macroeconomic variables using Korean data. An ‘unspanned’ model is free from the unrealistic assumption that the macroeconomic variables can be entirely generated by the first Nth-principal components of the term structure (macro-spanning restriction). It is also more flexible in the sense that the model permits feedback between the term structure and macroeconomic variables. The unspanned MTSM incorporated in this paper was suggested in Joslin, Priebsch, and Singleton (2012) and extended to the multi-lag form in Joslin, Le, and Singleton (2013). In the empirical section, we first conduct the macro-spanning test to determine the validity of the empirical analysis using the unspanned MTSM. The test results show that the term structure factors only explain some of the variations in the real economy (R2 = 13.43%) and the price variables (R2 = 15.40%), confirming the validity of modeling ‘unspanned’ macro variables. Empirically, we identify the macroeconomic variables with the highest explanatory power over the term structure of the interest rate in Korea. We estimate the model with the three term structure factors (level, slope, and curvature) and two combinations of the 82 key macroeconomic variables (i.e. 82C2 = 3,321 models are estimated). The performance of each combination of macroeconomic variables is measured by the various information criteria (AIC, SIC, and HQIC). In our analysis, the combination of the ‘nonfarm payrolls’ in the real economy variable group and ‘consumer price index excluding agricultural products and oils’ in the inflation variable group provides the best performance in explaining the Korean term structure of interest rates. The robustness of these variables is maintained even when we add more macroeconomic variables (i.e. combining the three macroeconomic variables) to the macro-finance term structure model. In the three macroeconomic variable cases, the third additional variable with a high explanatory power is ‘credit spreads’, the spread between AAA-rated and BBB+-rated corporate bond spread. We believe that the ‘nonfarm payrolls’ has the highest explanatory power, as noted by Wu and Zhang (2008) in the US case, because this variable carries information about not only the real economy growth, but also inflation. Then, using the identified three macroeconomic variables, we estimate the unspanned MTSM and analyze the effect that macroeconomic factors have on the market price of risk. Due to the ambiguity of the economic meaning of ‘nonfarm payrolls’, we use the ‘gross domestic product’—the second-best performing real economy variable—in the estimation. The results of this analysis show that the inflation variables have a pro-cyclical effect on the market price of the slope factor while the real economy variables have a pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) effect on the market price of the level (curvature) factor. However, the third macroeconomic variable—credit spreads—has a negligible effect on the bond risk premium. Finally, we conduct the impulse-response and variance decomposition analysis to show the empirical relationship between the three term structure factors and the three identified macroeconomic variables. We observe that a positive shock on the real economy variables increases the level factor, and as the credit spread widens, the level factor falls. A positive shock on the inflation variable also increases the slope factor, which widens the spread between short- and long-term yields. Finally, through variance decomposition, we confirm that the three macroeconomic variables explain 91% of the variation in the level factor, and 91.42% and 95.39% of the slope and curvature factors in the 36-month forecasting period.

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Based on the relationship between fund performance and the subsequent net flows, this study examines the net flow persistence. Earlier works have focused largely on the positive relationship between fund performance and the subsequent net flows. The most valuable information for fund investment is the past performance of each fund, yet one fund investor may consider the previous 6-month performance most important while another focuses on the previous 36-month performance. Investors’ interpretations of the concept of ‘past performance’ vary, and fund performance affects fund investors’ investment horizons differently. The economic motivation for this study is how fund investors use past fund performance to inform decision making, and how long their responses persist. In this study, we answer the following questions. First, what is the period for measuring past fund performance that has the most significant effect on net flows? Although earlier studies have fixed the past performance period, we use several past periods for measuring fund performance such as 1, 3, 6, 12, and 36 months. Some investors may chase the prior 1-year fund performance while others note the prior 2-year performance. Although different fund investors may make different investment decisions according to the prior fund performance, there could be a period that has the most influential effect on fund investment decisions. Second, how long does the fund performance affect the net flows? To the best of our knowledge, most studies have examined the relationship between the prior fund performance and the subsequent 1- or 3-month net flows. We take a different approach. The past performance of equity funds may affect future flows, but as time passes, the effect disappears. The net flows may follow fund performance for 1 month, 3 months, or longer. We define this duration effect of past performance as ‘flow persistence’ and it reflects the response duration of fund investors. The existence of flow persistence can be explained as follows. The fund performance information may be realized by fund investors after a time delay, or the fund investors may react to the information slowly. In this study, we test the flow persistence by examining the subsequent 1, 3, 6, 12, 24, and 36 months’ net flows following past performance. This concept of flow persistence is significantly different from the performance persistence of equity funds. Our goal is to provide an overall perspective on how fund investors react to past performance information. We measure the equity funds’ performance in multiple ways while analyzing the effects of past period performance and flow persistence; that is, past performance is measured by cumulative return, 1-factor alpha, 3-factor alpha, and 4-factor alpha. Each alpha is a risk-adjusted return. During the sample period, which ran from January 2004 to June 2012, the Korean fund markets were severely hit by the global financial crisis that originated in the U.S. Before the crisis, the fund markets were growing rapidly, but during the crisis, the global and Korean stock markets were sluggish, which led to the poor performance of equity funds. Numerous fund investors were surprised by plummeting fund returns. As a consequence, equity fund redemptions increased in the post-crisis period. In this study, we divide the entire period into two sub-periods, pre- and post-crisis, to determine the effect that the global financial crisis had on the relationship between fund performance and net flows. The empirical findings are as follows. First, the 1-year performance has the most significant influence on the net flows of equity funds, which implies that fund investors make their own investment decisions largely based on the prior 1-year performance rather than other performance periods. Our results support earlier studies that use prior 1-year performance as information to predict subsequent net flows. Second, the flow persistence lasts for 6 to 12 months. This reveals that prior fund performance affects the subsequent future net flows for 6 to 12 months. Third, we also test the effects of the past performance period and the flow persistence by measuring fund performance in many different ways. Additional tests prove the robustness of our results. Finally, we find that both the flow-performance relationship and the effect of flow persistence weaken during the post-crisis period. This study tests the effects of past fund performance as information for predicting subsequent net flow. We believe that our findings could provide new perspectives on how fund investors respond to past performance as information.

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We provide evidence supporting the presence of investors who prefer lottery-like stocks in the Korean stock market. Our empirical findings are as follows. First, we document that higher MAX stocks earn lower average returns, with MAX defined as the maximum daily return over the past month, as in Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011. Maxing out: Stocks as lotteries and the cross-section of expected returns. Journal of Financial Economics 99, 427-446). Specifically, we find that average risk-adjusted return differences between stocks in the lowest and highest MAX quintiles is 1.39 percent per month over our sample period. This finding suggests that investors have a preference for lottery-like assets, i.e., assets that have a relatively small chance of a large payoff. Given this preference, investors may be willing to pay more for stocks with lottery-like payoffs, prompting such stocks to have lower returns in the future. In this study, we measure the propensity for a stock to deliver lottery-like payoffs on the basis of MAX, defined as extreme positive returns over the past month, and find a negative relationship between MAX and expected returns in the cross-section. In other words, we demonstrate that lottery-like stocks, which presumably exhibit high MAX, have low expected returns in the Korean stock market, confirming previous findings for the U.S. market. Our finding of a negative relationship between MAX and expected returns appears to be robust to various cross-sectional effects such as size; book-to-market; and momentum, liquidity, and short-term return reversals. Both portfolio sorts and cross-sectional regressions reveal that the MAX-return relationship continues to be significant after controlling for other effects. Further, we find little evidence that the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle, i.e., the negative relationship between the idiosyncratic volatility and average returns in the cross-section documented by Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006. The cross-section of volatility and expected returns. Journal of Finance 61, 259-299), account for the relationship between MAX and returns. Considering that MAX is, on average, positively related to idiosyncratic volatility, one can argue that the negative MAX-return relationship is a different appearance of the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. However, our empirical results reveal that the MAX effect is robust to controls for the effect of idiosyncratic volatilities. Second, we find that stocks with high MAX tend to be small and low-priced, and have higher idiosyncratic volatility. Moreover, we observe that high MAX stocks are, on average, heavily traded by retail investors. MAX exhibits a monotonically increasing pattern in retail trading proportions (RTP) in the cross-section, where we define a stock’s RTP as the monthly buyer- and seller-initiated retail trading volume divided by the total trading volume of the stock in that month. This finding is consistent with the literature, which regards small, low-priced stocks exhibiting high idiosyncratic volatilities and skewness to have lottery-like features. Last, and most importantly, we find that the negative relationship between MAX and average returns is more prominent among stocks with higher retail trading proportions, using a unique dataset that enables us to identify retail investors’ trades. In particular, we find that the MAX-return relationship is more significant and negative among stocks with higher RTP. The strategy of selling high MAX stocks and buying low MAX stocks earns, on average, 1.87 (0.17) percent per month among stocks in the highest (lowest) RTP quintiles. This evidence is consistent with previous studies arguing that retail investors are more likely to have a greater gambling propensity. Collectively, we contribute to the literature on investors’ preferences by presenting evidence of investors’ preference for lottery-like stocks in the Korean stock market. We also contribute to the literature on retail investors’ trading behavior. We use a unique dataset from the Korean stock market that enables the identification of retail investors’ trades while providing empirical evidence that retail investors are more associated with the preference for lottery-like assets.

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In this paper, we aim to survey studies on financial intermediation in Korean financial markets with a view to understanding and evaluating the current status of financial intermediation services in Korea. Specific issues discussed include the relationship between economic growth and financial development, financial intermediation services such as liquidity provision, economizing transaction costs, production and transmission of information, monitoring, and the effects of relationship banking in Korea. We also discuss corporate restructuring driven by Korean banks as a special form of financial intermediation at the final stage of client firms’ lives, policy finance, and shadow banking which is regarded as an important factor influencing the future of financial intermediation in Korea. This survey reveals that while banks’ intermediation services are known to be special and value-additive in the US, for example, Korean studies have not shown the same. That is, research results show that banks’ intermediation services in Korea have been either insignificant or sometimes less than value-additive as benefits from intermediation services have been outweighed by associated costs. This result is partly because banks have had superior negotiation power to borrower firms in Korea, and partly because of the government’s dominating influence on bank behavior. It may also be because of sampling bias in terms of data period, as most studies use data near the 1997 financial crisis.

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This study analyses how the economic interests of a company’s largest shareholders affect the choice of secondary equity offering (“SEO”) floatation methods, forms of underwriting agreements with investment banks, and ultimately, the new share issuance price in a SEO where the information asymmetry is high amongst the largest shareholders, investment banks and investors. Unlike price discovery through bookbuilding process, issuing companies and investment banks determine issuance price prior to the offering in Korea. The SEO floatation methods and forms of underwriting agreement are publicly disclosed. This study differs itself from previous studies in that it evaluates how the economic interests of the largest shareholders as well as potential conflicts of interests amongst SEO participants may impact the selection of SEO floatation methods and forms of underwriting agreement. Furthermore, this study, by presenting the drivers behind a SEO and by analysing its effects, is anticipated to contribute to future research related to securities issuance, which is one of the most important financial decisions for corporations. The largest shareholders are seeking not only economic profits from SEO but also noneconomic objectives such as strengthened management control of the corporation. Investment banks tend to prioritize the relationship with the largest shareholders of the issuing company over the interests of retail investors. The forms of SEO can be classified into rights offering, rights offering with under subscribed shares to be offered to the public(“ROUP”), public offering, and 3rd party allotment. There are two types of underwriting agreements which include underwriting agreements on a firm commitment basis and best efforts basis. This study excludes cases where SEO is based on 3rd party allotment as well as those cases where underwriting agreements are non-existing. This study examines which floatation method of SEO is preferred according to the stakes of the largest shareholders and also identifies the financial variables which may have impact on the floatation method of SEO and forms of underwriting agreement chosen. Firstly, based on the analysis of precedent SEOs, we found that the higher the stake of the largest shareholders or the healthier the profitability and financial structure of a company, rights offerings is most preferred and public offering is least preferred. ROUP comes in between the rights offerings and public offerings. The main reason behind such outcome comes from the economic incentives of the largest shareholders. The largest shareholders take advantage of the situation where they possess superior information on the company relative to the retail investors. When the largest shareholders have higher stakes and therefore more economic interests, they tend to get more involved in the SEO process which could affect the economic benefit of minority investors and try to maintain or increase their existing stakes or trade preemptive rights to pursue economic interests. When the largest shareholders have lower stakes and therefore less economic rights, as long as the management control is secured, they tend not to commit more capital to maintaining their stakes not to share potential economic gains with outside investors because they’ve already disposed of significant stakes. Instead they’d rather seek another investment opportunity. In addition, outside investors would consider the largest shareholders’ trading of preemptive rights negative so that public offering is likely a choice of SEO floatation method in this case. Secondly, under ROUP, issuers prefer underwriting agreements on a firm commitment basis to minimize largest shareholders’ potential economic losses associated with under subscribed shares. The largest shareholders influence issuers to negotiate with investment banks to reflect their interests in the underwriting agreement. The less reputable investment banks aggressively take the risk of entering into an underwriting agreement on a firm commitment basis to get mandated for the SEO. The largest shareholders prefer underwriting agreement which guarantees that new shares be fully subscribed not to suffer from losses associated with under subscription which in turn has a negative effect on stock prices. On the other hand, in the case of public offerings where retail investors participate, the economic interests of the largest shareholders are less of importance and thus, issuers are indifferent to either form of underwriting agreement. Thirdly, under ROUP and underwriting agreements on a firm commitment basis, the level of discount and underpricing of issuance price is higher than that of the other SEO methods. This is the outcome of compromise of the conflicts of interests between the largest shareholders who want guarantee of the success of SEO and investment banks which want to minimize their underwriting risks. On the other hand, under underwriting agreements on a best efforts basis, because investment banks do not bear underwriting risks and only focus on the sale of new shares, they are not sensitive to the issuance price so there is no incentive for them to reduce the level of discount and the issuance price.

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Artificial neural networks (ANNs) with the logistic transforms are popular methods to increase the accuracy of performance forecasting due to their functional flexibility. In this paper, we estimate the accuracy of the ANNs models by conducting a data-driven search for optimal specifications. Our tests on foreign exchange rate forecast for the Korean won/US dollar show that the ANNs are superior to linear models. The superiority of the ANNs, however, does not hold for the Japanese yen/US dollar exchange rates. We use the success ratio (SR) as the out-of-sample forecasting performance evaluation. The directional accuracy (DA) test and the forecast comparison statistics of Diebold and Mariano (DM) are applied to assess the relative forecast performance of the ANNs as well. For the Korean won spot rate, it seems that there is much to be gained by using the ANNs for predicting the direction of change. The DA test results also show that the SR from the ANNs is generally greater than that from the AR models. For the Japanese yen, the ANNs achieve a lower SR in most cases. The balance between the in-sample fit and the out-of-sample forecast performance is well achieved for the Korean won exchange rate, but not for the Japanese yen exchange rate. This study is significant in that no previous works that evaluated the accuracy of exchange rate forecasts have applied a variety of tests in order to ascertain whether the ANNs of out-of-sample forecast performance actually achieve directional accuracy as economic criteria.

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This paper analyzes the liquidity component of corporate bond spreads using a new illiquidity measure for corporate bonds in Korean bond market. We perform the empirical study during 2005~2012, which spans before and after global economic crisis exacerbated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers. At first, we estimated directly liquidity measure λ with four liquidity variables: Amihud measures of price impact, turnover, zero trading days, and the variability. Next, we regressed corporate bond spreads on λ after controlling for another explanatory variables within each rating before and after global economic crisis period. Lastly, we calculated the size of liquidity component to look directly at the impact of corporate bond illiquidity on corporate bond spreads. Through this study of liquidity component, we could compare the size of liquidity premium on corporate bond spreads within each rating, and maturity before and after global economic crisis period. As results, before andafter the global economic crisis period, the effect of illiquidity on spreads was positive and statistically significant for AA and A-rated bonds meanwhile only for AA-rated bonds during the period. The size of liquidity component has become bigger since the global economic crisis period and was peaked at A-rated bonds with 2- to 5-year maturities. Those results shows that the liquidity component is comprised of important parts of issuing price of A-rated bonds whose maturities at the time of issuance are mostly 3 to 5 years.

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By the name of financial innovations, a large number of new financial products related to derivatives have been introduced into the global financial market for the last few decades. The Korean financial market was not an exception to this development. Among new financial products in Korea, the Equity-Linked Securities (hereafter ELS) may be considered one of the most successful products, judging from its market size. Since it was first introduced in 2002, the ELS have been very popular to individual investors who were cautious of downside risk of their investments. The ELS provided them with new tools to manage their future wealth. Therefore, the ELS can be thought as a good example of financial innovations in the Korean financial market. It is broadly accepted that financial innovations are originated by market imperfections, whereas there have been two competing theories about what drives financial institutions to invent new products. Because, unlike innovations in other industries, new products in financial industry are not protected by the patent law and should be disclosed publicly, financial innovations may have some different features from those in other industries. For instance, one could argue that that the benefit to financial innovator is not an excess profit. Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000) assumed that the imitation occurred immediately in the financial market, so they suggested that an innovator made an effort to increase the market share rather than to take excess profits. Herrera and Schroth (2003) also agreed that financial innovators could notmake more profits than imitators could. Moreover, they thought that the information about potential clients was the main source for innovators to be able to increase their market shares. These theories were supported by the empirical research of Tufano (1989). He tested this hypothesis with data related to corporate securities and MBS (Mortgage-Backed Securities) and found that financial innovators could not impose higher margin, while they could extend their market shares. In contrast, Van Horne (1985) argued that financial innovators could take profits before imitators appeared even though there was no legal protection in the financial market. His theory was based on the traditional monopoly theory and it was empirically supported by Carrow (1999) and Schroth (2002). Carrow (1999) found that innovator’s profit decreased as more rivals came into the market and Schroth (2002) reported that the source of innovator’s excess margin was the superior knowledge about a new product. Using 4,521 issuance data during the early stage of ELS market in Korea, this paper empirically examines whether first movers, or innovators, earn more profits than imitators do. We also test whether the profit of innovators declines as the time passes by. As a proxy for profit, we estimate the total margin of ELS, the difference between the actual issue price and the theoretical price of ELS divided by the actual issue price. This measure represents the proportion of issuer’s margin to the total price of ELS and it gives us the information about how much innovators charge on different products. In creating new products, the characteristics of embedded option in ELS are at the issuer’s discretion and the issuer’s profit is mainly determined by how the embedded option component is valued. Thus, for the robustness of our empirical results, we also estimate the margin of embedded option in ELS, the difference of the value of the embedded option in ELS and its theoretical value divided by the value of embedded option. Then we perform regression analysis with the total margin or the option margin as a dependent variable. To control the effects of hedging costs, we also use the product type, the number of underlying asset type, the maturity, and the embedded option type, and issue type (private/public issue) for controlling variables. The empirical results show that innovators in the ELS market could earn more margin than imitators do. These results are inconsistent with the theory of Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000). However, margins decline as the market becomes more competitive. The results also show that the large sized financial institutions innovate more frequently and earn higher margins than lower sized firms do. Our empirical results have important implications for regulatory policy regarding entry barrier. To issue the ELS in the Korean market, securities firms should get permission from the regulatory authority. Therefore, in the Korean ELS market, innovators protected by the regulatory barrier could have taken excess profits, despite of the fact that some competitors exist in the market. Moreover, they can maintain their margin policies after competitors come in. The regulation of Korean ELS market was aimed to protect investors from issuers’ insolvency. However, it resulted in protecting first-movers from followers as well. As a consequence, innovators in the ELS market become superior to imitators, which prevent a fair competition. In the future, the regulation authority should consider both the investor protection and the market competition.

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To better understand the nature of family-owned firms, one must distinguish management from control rights (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Also not all controlling sh-areholders in family firms serve as CEOs. When professional managers serve as CEOs of family firms, the controlling shareholders often assume the role of monitoring the hired managers. Therefore, these firms end up bearing some agency costs that incur between the owner and professional managers. While the owner-manager conflict can be mitigated in firms in which family members serve as CEOs (henceforth, ‘family CEO’), the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders can be also intensified (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Taken all factors into consideration, family CEOs can affect firm performance in both positive and negative ways. By definition, controlling shareholders of any business groups face the dilemma whether to get involved in the firm management. And yet, not much research has been conducted on this issue as to address the question which is better for the firm. This must have been so perhaps because of data limitations. In fact, Lin and Hu (2007) is the only study that directly addresses the selection issue. However, their sample is limited to listed Taiwanese firms, not sufficient to account for general characteristics of business groups including unlisted firms. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first study of its kind to analyze the determinants of family CEO using information of all affiliatesboth listed and unlisted- belonging to the same business groups. When a family keeps control of a firm, its controlling shareholders can get involved in the management as CEOs or the like to maximize the sum of the value of the retained block and the private benefits obtained (Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer, 2003). If maximizing the former is intended, family CEO can positively affect firm performance as long as he/she has good management skills. But if maximizing the latter is intended, family CEO can be negatively related to firm performance. Stein (1989) and James (1999) develop a model illustrating the positive effect of long-term investors on firms’ investment efficiency especially when they are the members of the family that owns the firm. The study explains that such long-term investors can minimize myopic investment decisions by managers. Anderson and Reeb (2003) empirically find that firms with family CEOs outperform those with professional CEOs for this reason. On the other hand, controlling shareholders of family firms don’t tend to take enough advantage of competitive managerial labor market since they are likely to limit management control to their own family circles. Such practice of ‘nepotism’ can harm firm performance (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006). As such, existing theoretical and empirical studies about the effect of family CEO on firm performance are contradictory. To draw its own conclusion, this paper first investigates the precise determinants of family CEO before probing the question of family CEO’s effect on firm performance. Finally to reflect the endogenous nature inherent in family CEOs, the self-selection or reverse causality issue is addressed through modeling family CEO as an endogenous choice. Using the Korean business group data from 2001 through 2011, the following results are found. First, firms with higher cash flow rights of controlling shareholders and larger equity portion in affiliates are more likely to have family CEOs. This means that controlling shareholders tend to serve as CEOs to maximize their control rights over the business group as well as the value of their stake, supporting a proposition of Burkart et al. (2003). Second, family CEO negatively affects firm profitability measured by EBITDA. This implies that when controlling shareholders serve as CEOs, agency costs between themselves and minority shareholders increase. Also, only for firms with non-family CEOs, their investments have a significantly positive impact on EBITDA, indicating that professional CEOs commit more to efficient investments than family CEOs do. Third, for firms with family CEOs, higher cash flow rights and larger equity portion in affiliates are associated with lower firm values measured by Tobin’s q. This implies that the concentration of ownership and management by controlling shareholders induces agency problems due to the entrenchment effect, making them commit to maximizing control rights over the business group although the value of their shares is damaged. On the other side, for non-family CEO, larger equity portion in affiliates is associated with higher firm value, implying that professional CEOs invest more efficiently in affiliates’ equity than family CEOs do. But the effect of cash flow rights on firm values is insignificant for these firms. Just like the results on EBITDA, investments have a significantly positive impact on firm values only for the sample with non-family CEO. Fourth, controlling the endogeneity of family CEO through Heckman (1979)’s model, family CEO still negatively affects value as well as profitability of firm. Fifth, through a robustness check we found that firm profitability worsens only when family CEO runs the firm; if professional managers are CEOs and family members are not involved in the management position, those firms show higher value. This finding suggests that securing an independent professional management system without family members can be the most effective way to maximize corporate value in the business group. Overall, the findings indicate that when controlling shareholders with potentially powerful influence over the business group directly manages the firm, they are highly like to be driven by the self-serving incentive to maximize their controlling rights over the business group, rather than to commit themselves to increasing firm value through efficient investments. By drawing this conclusion, this study sheds more light on this unexplored yet salient question of which organizational structure, with or without family CEOs, is more efficient.

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